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Madeleine Albright , Gender, and 
Foreign Policy-Making 
Kevin J. Lashe r 
Francis Marion University 
Women are finally becoming major participants in the 
U.S. foreign policy-making establishment . I seek to un-
derstand how th e arrival of women foreign policy-makers 
might influence the outcome of U.S. foreign polic y by fo-
cusi ng 011 th e activities of Mad elei n e A !bright , the first 
wo man to hold the position of Secretary of State . I con-
c lude that A !bright 's gender did hav e some modest im-
pact. Gender helped Albright gain her position , it 
affected the manner in which she carried out her duties , 
and it facilitated her working relationship with a Repub-
lican Congress. But A !bright 's gender seemed to have had 
relatively little effect on her ideology and policy recom-
mendations . 
Over the past few decades more and more women have won election to public office and obtained high-level appointive positions in government, and this trend is 
likely to continue well into the 21st century. The growing num-
bers of women serving in public office raise crucial questions 
about the political importance of gender. As more and more 
women enter the political world, it is critically important that we 
understand what the consequences are likely to be for both pub-
1 ic policy and the political process. 
One of the few areas of political life where women 's partici-
pation has lagged somewhat is in government agencies responsi-
ble for the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign 
policy. Such agencies include the Department of State, Depart-
ment of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of the 
Treasury and others. Nevertheless, the last ten years have seen 
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two women serve at the top of the foreign policy-making proc-
ess. Madeleine Albright served as President Bill Clinton's Secre-
tary of State from 1997-2001 , and Condoleezza Rice , recently 
appointed to the same post, served as National Security Advisor 
to President George W. Bush for four years. 
Of course , women's access to foreign policy roles has gone 
far beyond these two high-profile women . A rough estimate is 
that women represent approximately 15% of top and mid-level 
positions in the foreign policy bureaucracy. The Women 's For-
eign Policy Group , a Washington organization, examined female 
representation in the U .S. Department of State . The group re-
ported that women comprised 18% of the career senior foreign 
service, 22% of ambassadors, and approximately 35% of top of-
ficials in the late 1990s (Levin son and Baker 1998). In 1981, 
15% of the almost 4000 foreign service officers were women , 
whereas 32% of the 3500 foreign service officers were women in 
2000 . Also in 2000 , there were 3 women Undersecretaries out of 
6; 10 women Assistant Secretaries out of 37; 28 women Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries out of 98; and 35 women Ambassadors out 
of 157 (Leader 2001). Thus , the era of women as foreign policy-
makers has finally arrived . 
What does the arrival of high-level women foreign policy-
makers mean for the formulation and implementation of U.S. 
foreign policy? What particular problems, if any, do women offi-
cials face while operating within a p1imarily male field like for-
eign policy-making ? Do women foreign policy-makers have 
different policy priorities than their male counterparts ? Do 
women view the foreign policy process , the way decisions are 
made in the United States , differently from men? This article 
intends to offer some very preliminary and limited answers to 
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these questions by examining the activities of Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright from 1997-2001. 1 
WOMEN AS FOREIGN POLICY-MAKERS AND LEADERS 
Through the 1980s, the influence of women on the foreign 
policy process in the United States was quite limited. Even those 
women with some influence often operated as critics outside the 
system. A small number of women occupied medium-level pol-
icy-making positions inside the Foreign Service of the State De-
partment; and fewer still were appointed as ambassadors or to 
other important diplomatic posts. When Jeanne Kirkpatrick was 
appointed to serve as President Ronald Reagan's Ambassador to 
the United Nations in 1981, she became the highest ranking fe-
male diplomat in U.S. history. Kirkpatrick made a powerful im-
pression with her strong defense of American positions at the 
United Nations; however, she was not considered a major player 
in the Reagan foreign policy team (Ewell 1992, 166-I 67). Even 
though she was a member of the Cabinet and the National Secu-
rity Council, Kirkpatrick's main responsibility as U.N. Ambassa-
dor was policy implementation not policy formulation. 
Nancy McGlen and Meredith Sarkees ( 1995) discuss three 
gender stereotypes that have limited women's involvement in 
foreign policy-making: (1) the view that women should focus on 
home and family, (2) the view that women are unsuited to the 
work of national security issues and diplomacy, and (3) the view 
that women are less knowledgeable than men about foreign af-
fairs. They concluded a decade ago that "these cultural stereo-
types culminate in widespread discrimination against women 
seeking jobs in government and, more particularly, foreign af-
1 This article was completed soon after Condoleezza Rice was nominated and confirmed 
as the second female secretary of state. A comparison of the first two female secretaries 
of state would be a valuable research project. 
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fairs" ( I 995, 12). Eleanor Dulles, who worked in the State De-
partment in the 1940s and 1950s, commented on the blatant dis-
crimination suffered by women in that era. She observed that, 
"this place is a real man's world-if there ever was one. It's rid-
dled with prejudices! If you are a woman in government service 
you just have to work ten times as hard-and even then it takes 
much skill to paddle around the various taboos. But it is fun to 
see how far you can get in spite of being a woman" (Hoff-Wilson 
1992, 182). 
There is no doubt that the situation for women in foreign af-
fairs has improved considerably in the last two decades. In 1976, 
Foreign Service Officer Alison Palmer filed, with several other 
officers, a class action sex discrimination suit in the U.S. District 
Court. Another sex discrimination suit, filed in 1977 by Mar-
guitte Cooper, was merged with the Palmer case in 1978 (Jef-
freys-Jones 1994). After two decades, the cases were finally 
decided in favor of the plaintiffs. In its final decree, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court ordered the State Department to mandate diversity 
training for all foreign service officers and their managers, 
eliminate sex discrimination in its personnel practices, and 
strengthen anti-discrimination procedures (Leader 200 I). The 
court also mandated that an unspecified number of women who 
had claimed discrimination in promotions receive automatic 
promotions.2 
In addition to these lawsuits, other factors have played impor-
tant roles in enhancing opportunities for women in the State De-
partment, including the continuing advancement of women in 
other parts of American society, the end of the Cold War, the ex-
pansion of foreign policy to include economic, environmenta l 
and other issues, changes within the culture of the State Depart-
2 TI1e State Department established various procedures to improve women 's career pros-
pects prior to the final court decision . 
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ment, and the determination of the Clinton administration to 
promote women to positions of prominence . Women now have 
more positions in the foreign policy bureaucracy than ever be-
fore. They have not quite reached parity, but they are getting 
close. 
Because there exists a powerful stereotype that women are 
more pacifistic than men, the inclusion of more women in the 
foreign policy process has led some to suppose that non-military 
solutions to international problems will become more popular. 
Public opinion research has in fact demonstrated that there is a 
small, but important , gender gap on a variety of defense and for-
eign policy issues. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (1995, 10) states that an 
"emphasis on peace is an enduring ingredient in the gender gap 
that separates women in the aggregate from men in American 
politics ." Since the 1940s, public opinion research has shown 
that "women have been less supportive of the use of force to 
maintain peace abroad and more supportive of negotiated settle-
ments" (Conway, Steuernagel and Ahern 1997, 38). Francis Fu-
kuyma (1998) points out that American women have always 
been less supportive of U.S. military actions, including World 
War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, by an average 
of 7 to 9%. Nancy McGlen and Meredith Sarkees (1993, 190) 
examined a number of studies on public opinion and concluded 
that there was an 8-9 percentage point gap between men and 
women on the willingness to use force in domestic and interna-
tional relations. Hence , women in the public at large do seem to 
possess more peaceful attitudes than do males , but the size of 
this foreign policy gender gap is rather modest. 
There is, in any case, very little evidence that women foreign 
policy-makers are generally more peace-oriented , or more likely 
to bring about a peaceful foreign policy, than are men. One the-
ory holds that women who break into the foreign policy world of 
men "have to be especially tough" and that they "assume what 
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are thought of as masculine characteristics not just for tactical 
reasons but because in political tem1s they have become men ' 
(Hoff-Wilson 1992, 2). Such women may become even more 
hawkish than their male counterparts . Perhaps , as Hoff-Wilson 
(1992 , 186) also argues, one cannot expect gender to make much 
of a difference "until there is a generation of women foreign pol-
icy formulators who are feminists ," and "a significant number of 
feminists [come to dominate] top policy-making positions ." 
In one of the few studies of women foreign policy-makers, 
Nancy McGlen and Meredith Sarkees (2001) found little evi-
dence of an overall gender gap between male and female policy-
makers in the Departments of State and Defense . They also ob-
served that "the appointment of Madeline Albright as Secretary 
of State has apparently not moved the United States toward a 
more pacific foreign policy" (2001 , 143). They did find some 
gender differences after carrying out a more detailed analysis 
within both departments , and concluded that there was a strong 
tendency for women career officers in the State Department to 
adopt more moderate foreign policy views than their male coun -
terparts. On the other hand , these researchers found that wome n 
political appointees in the State Department and the Defense De-
partment , as well as women career officers at Defense, adopted 
more hard-line and conservative views . McGlen and Sarkees 
look to the different political cultures of the two depa11ments for 
an explanation. For careerists, they (2001, 139) explain that 
"women coming into Defense may, in an attempt to fit in to an 
overwhelmingly male-dominated and conservative organizatio n, 
overcompensate and become too conservative , while women in 
State might overcompensate and become more liberal." Since 
their data come from the 1980s, they tend to see the conservative 
views of women political appointees at both State and Defense 
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as a result of the quest for " ideological purity" in the Reagan 
administration. 3 This important research seems to suggest that 
women foreign policy-makers are not very likely to bring peace-
oriented attitudes with them as they enter the top levels of the 
foreign policy bureaucracy. 
Another viewpoint is offered by Ann Miller Morin (1995). 
She interviewed 34 of 44 women who served as U.S. ambassa-
dors in the period 1933-1993 .4 Understandably, a few of these 
women ambassadors were ineffective; however, Morin con-
cludes that overall these women performed to a high standard. 
Similarities among these pioneers included high academic 
achievement, love for their job, patriotism, courage , a deep work 
ethic, and a strong sense of self-worth. Their preferred manage-
ment style was collegial not hierarchical. Interestingly, Morin 
( 1995, 264) concludes that "most were charismatic and physi-
cally attractive." Certainly these women made remarkable ac-
complishments in an era when society was still generally 
opposed to their efforts. All of the interviewees had experienced 
some forms of discrimination , but few seemed to be overly con-
cerned about it. They accepted "the fact of discrimination as a 
condition of the times and carried on without too much grum-
bling" (Morin 1995, 270). There was and still is a strong ten-
dency for women ambassadors to be assigned to countries of 
limited importance (Enloe 2000). Hence, in one sense, these 
women faced (and still face) more problems from within their 
own State Department than from their host countries. As Morin 
(1995, 272) explains 
3 It would be extremely valuable to conduct a similar survey of current men and women 
in both departments . 
4 Of the 44 female ambassadors in this period, only 6 served prior to the 1960s. 
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One perceived disadvantage for women, the lack of 
respect from the host government and people , proved 
to be a non-issue once a woman was at the post. All 
American women ambassadors have been accorded 
the deference and respect appropriate to their posi-
tion. The power of the United States ensures that the 
sex of the ambassador is irrelevant. 
Morin argues that women ambassadors in fact have certain 
advantages. They are able to speak bluntly to male officials, es-
pecially in the developing nations, without offending them. And 
since women ambassadors are less likely to have a dominating 
presence they can be accepted as a non-threatening, sympathetic 
presence and a source of support. 
Of course, women have had major foreign policy responsi-
bilities in other countries-as presidents and prime ministers. 
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Indira Gandhi of India, Golda Meier 
of Israel, Violetta Chamorro of Nicaragua and Corazon Aquino 
of the Philippines are some of the best known female chief ex-
ecutives. In a broad sense, they all carried out their duties of 
managing their countries' respective foreign policies. Perhaps the 
best known female national leader is Margaret Thatcher, who 
served as British Prime Minister from 1979-1990. Known as the 
"Iron Lady," Thatcher supported a tough line against the Soviet 
Union in the early 1980s and prosecuted the Falklands War 
against Argentina. While Thatcher was a foreign policy hawk 
and had no feminist agenda, it is important to note that she was 
ahead of President Reagan in recognizing the possibilities for 
change in Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Thatcher's quick 
analysis of Gorbachev in December 1984 became famous: "f like 
Mr. Gorbachev; we can do business together" (Young 1989, 
393). According to Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (1994, 161 ), the title 
"Iron Lady" always referred more to Thatcher's tough demeanor 
in domestic politics as opposed to a warlike character. Still, there 
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is no denying that she took a strong conservative approach to 
foreign policy issues . 
Golda Meier, Indira Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto also had 
reputations of being foreign policy hawks. On the other hand , 
President Vigdis Finnbogadottir of Iceland and Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway both pursued quite liberal 
foreign policies and were viewed as strong feminists (Jeffreys-
Jones 1994, 169). Interviews with women heads of state show 
that "most believe that they are more committed to peace than 
their male counterparts " (Jaquette 1997, 35). Thus , female chief 
exec utives have presented a range of foreign policy approaches . 
Tom Lansford (2003 , 183) concludes that "the record of female 
leader s is just as varied as their male counterparts and demon-
strate s the impracticality of using gender to differentiate between 
leadership styles ." 
FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Feminist theorists also provide perspectives relevant to our 
subject. Although feminist scholars differ on particular issues 
concerning foreign policy and international politics, they gener-
ally agree that both are "gendered. " This means essentially that 
the world of international politics is controlled by men in order 
to serve male interests , and is interpreted by other men, con-
sciously and unconsciously , according to male perspectives. For 
example , according to feminists the dominant international rela-
tions theory of realism reflects, not a universal search for power , 
but rather the behavior of states run by men . Feminist theorists 
see an international system composed of gender hierarchies 
which are "socially constructed and maintained through power 
structures that work against women 's participation in foreign and 
national security policy-making " (Tickner 2001 , 21 ). Interna-
tional relation s and foreign policy have always been dominated 
VOL. 33 2005 
48 LASHER 
by men; the actions, needs, and interests of women have usually 
been ignored. 
Most feminist theorists of international relations seek a world 
in which much larger numbers of women rise to the highest posi-
tions of authority, leadership and power. They disagree as to 
whether women should get ahead in foreign affairs by demon-
strating traditional masculine virtues of toughness and aggres-
sion, or whether they should move the agenda of foreign affairs 
away from male preoccupations with hierarchy and domination 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 171). Another disagreement 
concerns the logic behind women's participation: one view be-
lieves that women should become more involved because their 
peaceful nature is likely to lead to less world conflict (Steans 
1998); an alternative view is that women are no more peaceful 
than men, but that they should become more involved in interna-
tional affairs as a matter of right (McGlen and Sarkees 1995, 4). 
For many feminist theorists, it is not really relevant if particu-
lar women rise to the top of the foreign policy-making system. 
Because the entire system is "masculine," these powerful women 
have little choice but to act in a masculine fashion.5 Cynthia 
Enloe (2000, 6) explains that "when a woman is let in by the 
men who control the political elite, it usually is precisely because 
that woman has learned the lessons of masculinized political be-
havior well enough not to threaten male political privilege." 
Margaret Thatcher is often cited as just such a "permissible" fe-
male leader. In fact, the participation of the occasional woman in 
the foreign policy elite may actually strengthen the overall gen-
dered system-by suggesting that women are now equal players 
in this male-created system. "Masculine" female leaders do not 
challenge the gender stereotypes; in fact, they help to perpetuate 
5 This is not a view shared by all feminist theorists of international relations . 
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them. If traditional gender relations stay in place, more women 
in power do not necessarily produce a foreign policy that is "bet-
ter" for women (Peterson and Runyan 1999). 
Feminist scholars are much more interested in the grass-roots 
efforts of women activists than in the actions of women who 
have entered the top of the foreign policy-making world (Tickner 
2001 ). These scholars do not pay much attention to notable 
women such as Golda Meier, Madeleine Albright or Condo-
leezza Rice. 6 They do see the possibility, as more and more 
women enter the international relations professions, of trans-
fom1ing the current masculine-dominated system. And the grow-
ing number of women foreign policy-makers, both in the United 
States and abroad, represents a movement toward this possibility. 
Still, this new wave of female decision-makers has not yet been 
studied by feminist scholars. 
The real hope of many feminist theorists is to transform the 
current masculine foreign policy-making and international sys-
tem. Perhaps this is not unrealistic-Cynthia Enloe suggests that 
those in power are remarkably insecure and their power re-
markably unstable. If feminist scholars and women activists can 
expose how world politics depends on artificial notions of mas-
culinity and femininity, more of us might come to realize that 
"this seemingly over-whelming world system may be more frag-
ile and open to radical change than we have been led to imagine" 
(Enloe 2000, 17). Peterson and Runyan (1999, 237) describe the 
ultimate goal of many feminist theorists: 
A great deal must change before world politics is un-
gendered. Ungendering world politics requires a seri-
ous rethinking of what it means to be human and how 
we might organize ourselves in more cooperative, 
• It should be noted that much of the feminist literature has preceded the recent appoint-
ments or Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice. 
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mutually respectful ways. We would have to reject 
gendered dichotomies : male versus female, us versus 
them, culture versus nature . We would have to rec-
ognize power in its multiple forms and be willing to 
imagine other worlds. Overall , these changes are less 
a matter of top-down policy than of individually and 
collectively remaking human society by reconstruct-
ing our identities, beliefs, expectations , and institu-
tions. This is the most difficult and complex of 
human projects, but history shows that we are capa-
ble of such revolutionary transformations . 
Taking into account both feminist speculations and the lim-
ited empirical data we have on women and foreign policy-
making, we might well conclude, with Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones 
(1995, 2), that "the field of women and foreign policy is full of 
contradictions and complexities , and for that reason is particu-
larly intriguing." Despite the likelihood that women foreign pol-
icy-makers share a similar world view with their male 
counterparts, there is strong evidence that a "gender gap" does 
exist in the foreign policy views of the average American man 
and woman. Does this gap have any impact on the powerful 
women that are now entering the arenas of U.S. foreign policy-
making? Then too, there is the long-held and powerful belief that 
women, at their core, are somehow more peace-oriented than 
men. Might this questionable surmise have an impact on female 
leaders, even those who have adopted masculine characteristics 
and adjusted to the expectations of their bureaucratic home? 
Feminist scholars are unconvinced that a few key high-level 
women can have much impact on the U.S. foreign policy proc-
ess. Nevertheless, they also maintain as a fundamental premise 
that enough women at various levels of government have the 
capability of transforming the very nature of U.S. foreign policy-
making and the international system. What is the proper number 
of women needed to make a transformational difference, and is it 
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smaller number of key female policy-makers to make an impor-
tant , if not transfonnative, difference? 
As more and more women enter the top levels of the U.S. 
foreign policy-making process, there remain a host of important 
questions and very few clear answers. Thus, it is relevant and 
important to examine the activities of the highest ranking female 
foreign policy-maker in U.S. history, Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright , in order to begin the process of finding some an-
swers. It would be surprising if we discovered shocking 
differences between Albright and her male predecessors. But it is 
quite possible that Secretary Albright displayed some subtle and 
nuanced differences that are worthy of our attention. Thus, we 
tum to a consideration of Madeleine Albright, the first women to 
hold the position of Secretary of State . 
WINNING OFFICE 
Madeleine Korbel Albright was born in 1937 in Prague, 
Czechoslovakia. Her father, a Czech diplomat and later Professor 
of International Relations at the University of Denver, was to 
have a profound influence on her worldview. Albright and her 
family fled Czechoslovakia with the Nazi take-over in 1939. Af-
ter returning home in 1945, the Korbels left Czechoslovakia for 
the United States following the communist take-over in 1948 
(Blackman 1998). The actions of the Nazi and communist re-
gimes were to have a profound influence on the political views 
of both father and daughter. 
Albright attended prestigious Wellesley College from 1955-
59, just before the beginning of the modem women's movement. 
She married newspaperman Joseph Albright, heir to a major 
newspaper chain, and had three children by 1967. As her hus-
band moved to various positions, she began taking graduate 
courses in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University 
and Columbia University in the 1960s. One of her most influen-
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tial professors at Columbia was Zbigniew Brzezinski , who 
would later serve as National Security Adviser to President 
Jimmy Carter (Lippman 2004) . 
Albright entered Democratic Party politics in Washington as a 
campaign volunteer in the early 1970s. In 1976, she became 
chief legislative assistant to Senator Edmund Muskie and also 
received her Ph.D. from Columbia University . Two years later, 
she joined the Carter administration as director of Congressional 
Relations for the National Security Council under Brzezinski 
(Dobbs 2000). 
From 1982 to 1993, Albright was a professor of foreign pol-
icy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and 
also served as director of the Women in Foreign Service pro-
gram. Although she never received tenure , she was one of the 
most popular professors at Georgetown (Blood 1999). Her per-
sonal life was troubled by a 1982 divorce , and this divorce would 
have a profound impact on her future career. 
During the Reagan and Bush years , Albright hosted dinners 
for leading foreign policy thinkers , and her foreign policy "sa-
lon" became a magnet for major players within the Democratic 
Party. Albright served as a foreign policy adviser to vice presi-
dential nominee Geraldine Ferraro during the 1984 campaign , 
and this appointment led to the position of chief foreign policy 
adviser to presidential nominee Michael Dukakis four years later 
(Dobbs 2000). During the presidential campaign of 1992, she 
became one of many informal advisers to Governor Bill Clinton. 
President Clinton named her U.S. Ambas sador to the United Na-
tions , a position with Cabinet status , following his election. She 
was also a member of Clinton 's National Security Council. 
At the United Nations , Albright earned a reputation for blunt 
language and a forceful defense of American interest s. She fre-
quently appeared on television as a spokesperson for President 
Clinton 's foreign policy , in place of the less effective Secretary 
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of State WarTen Christopher and national security advisor An-
thony Lake. She was an early and strong advocate of interven-
tion in Bosnia, ahead of most of her colleagues in the Clinton 
administration. One of her most notable accomplishments at the 
U.N. was her maneuver to prevent U.N. Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali from serving a second term (Blood 
1999). It is generally believed that her policy-making contribu-
tions were somewhat limited during her time as U.N. Ambassa-
dor. 
Before the election of 1996, Secretary of State William Chris-
topher made plans to step down from his position. The leading 
candidates to replace Christopher were Albright, former Assis-
tant Secretary of State and Bosnian envoy Richard Holbrooke, 
Senate Minority Leader George Mitchell, and retiring Senator 
Sam Nunn of Georgia (Blood 1999). The first-term Clinton for-
eign policy team had suffered considerable criticism for policy 
failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and for lacking a co-
herent strategic vision. Key members of the foreign policy team, 
including Christopher, were ineffective on television. U.N. Am-
bassador Albright was often called upon to appear on the Sunday 
talk shows to fill that gap, and Clinton wanted a secretary of 
state who could successfully present U.S. foreign policy to the 
country and the world. 
Outgoing White House Chief of Staff Leon E. Panetta be-
lieved that Albright's communication skills were a pivotal factor 
in her ultimate selection. Panetta suggested that Clinton was 
ready to play a stronger role in framing his own foreign policy 
agenda during his second term, and that Albright's forceful style 
would make her a more effective spokesperson for the new Clin-
ton foreign policy . 7 Additionally, Clinton was attracted to the 
7 Michael Dobbs, ''With Albright, Clinton Accepts New U.S. Role," Washington Post , 8 
December 1996. 
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politics of symbolism, and gender issues were no exception. He 
had entered office promising a cabinet that "looked like" Amer-
ica, and his first cabinet featured three women, including Al-
bright as U.N. Ambassador. One top administration official 
reported "You tell him, Jesus, boss, that 's never been done be-
fore, and it's a good way to get him to do it. You show him a 
glass ceiling, and he' II pick up a rock" (Blackman 1998, 257). 
Blackman (1998, 13) expands on this account by contending that 
Albright's selection was also affected by the fact that she "was 
the candidate with whom the Clintons-both Bill and Hillary-
felt most comfortable . President Clinton realized that he had in 
her a dazzling speaker with unquestioned loyalty to the people 
she served, a natural politico who could handle the press while 
giving him credit for American foreign policy decisions and not 
seek acclaim herself , as Henry Kissinger had done under Richard 
Nixon." 
President Clinton clearly admired Albright 's loyalty. "She 
was tough and strong on the issues that I thought were important, 
especially on Bosnia," Clinton said. "She supported what I did 
on Haiti. When we had to do difficult things that didn't have a lot 
of popular support in the beginning, she on principle agreed with 
me. I could see she was willing to take risks ." Clinton concluded, 
"I thought she would be the person most likely to connect with 
the American people , to bring the message of our foreign policy 
home" (Blackman 1998, 14 ). 
Mobilizing behind Albright was an "o ld girls" network, in-
cluding friends Senator Barbara Mikulski , Representative Bar-
bara Kennelly , and Geraldine Ferraro. President Clinton, who 
had been reelected with a large margin among women voters, 
was eager to please this critical voting bloc. Shortly after the 
election, White House aides leaked to the press that Albright was 
in a "second tier" of candidates , and this remark infuriated her 
high-powered female friends. "That was like, kazam!" exclaimed 
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Senator Mikulski. " It was an insult to all of us who have worked 
so hard and played by the rules. And it gave us the opportunity to 
launch a full-court press" (Blood 1999, 24). 
Indeed, they did launch a full-court press. The White House 
was swamped with calls from congresswomen and women's 
groups. President Clinton was lobbied by a few members of the 
"old girls" network. Representative Kennelly called Vice Presi-
dent Gore directly, suggesting to him that Clinton's unprece-
dented level of support among female voters was not 
automatically transferable to him. Gore's office responded by 
releasing a statement that said that the Vice President considered 
Albright a serious candidate (Albright 2003, 221 ). Arguably, the 
pressure from women's groups almost backfired. Ann Blackman 
(1998, 265) believes that "C linton resented the intense lobbying 
of the women's organizations, and contrary to the fenunists' 
view, if anything had come close to derailing Albright as his top 
choice, that was it." 
Another strong supporter of Ambassador Albright was first 
lady Hillary Clinton. Albright had begun her relationship with 
the First Lady on several trips, including attending the Interna-
tional Women's Conference in China in 1995. Many White 
House officials believe that Albright was personally closer to 
Hillary than to the President. According to one top Clinton offi-
cial, Albright "to uches base with Hillary all the time, advises her 
on international stuff, sends her memos and materials. And they 
both smooze about Wellesley. Madeleine's great champion for 
this job was Mrs. Clinton. Knowing that, there was never any 
doubt in my mind she would get it" (Blackman 1998, 256-7). 
Albright (2003, 220) acknowledges that there has been much 
speculation about the First Lady's role in her appointment, and 
indirectly admits that Hillary Clinton did help her get the job. 
Thomas Blood (1999, 29) explains that "the truth was that 
Hillary Clinton desperately wanted to see Madeleine Albright get 
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the top post at State , but after years of taking more than her fair 
share of cheap shots, the First Lady reasoned that discretion was 
the better part of valor, and decided to work on Albright 's behalf 
behind the scenes. " Hillary Clinton (2003 , 393) had this to say 
about the matter: "When Bill asked me about Madeleine , I told 
him there was nobody who had been more supportive of his 
policies and was as articulate and persuasive on the issues. I also 
added that her appointment would make many girls and women 
proud. " 
Despite such support , there was considerable opposition to 
Albright within the Clinton White House. Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin, Clinton adviser Vernon Jordan , and incoming 
Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles were among the heavy-hitters op-
posing her nomination (Blood l 999, 15). Besides favoring other 
candidates , opponents seemed to think that Albright 's gender 
made her ineligible for the job . Albright (2003, 219) admits that 
"many of my supporters were convinced that the opposition from 
males was a kind of discrimination ," while suggesting more 
charitably that opposition was due to "a combination of factors , 
including the historic male monopoly on the post, a feeling of 
men being more comfortable with men , and concerns I hoped 
were misplaced about my qualifications. " 
Would Madeleine Albright really have the capability of deal-
ing with a group of mostly male foreign leaders and foreign min-
isters? Thomas Blood (1999 , 33) highlights the issue: 
Shortly before going public with the selection, the 
President placed a phone call to a longtime ally now 
serving in a diplomatic post in the Middle East. The 
-purpose of the call was to take one last poll of an old 
friend on the selection of Madeleine Albright. ... By 
the time it was over the President was wringing his 
hands. His trusted friend had been blunt. Madeleine 
Albright was totally qualified to serve as Secretary of 
State, but he couldn ' t support her. He told the Presi-
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dent that the majority of the trouble spots on the geo-
political landscape were in the third world. And most 
of these were Islamic nations. Their leaders would 
never take her seriously because she was a woman. 
57 
Clinton was genuinely puzzled by the lack of support among 
some of his advisors for Albright's nomination. Fortunately for 
Albright, the First Lady told the President exactly what he 
needed to hear. "Forget about what your advisors think," was her 
advice. "Trust your gut Bill," she told him repeatedly (Blood 
1999, 33) . In the end, he did, and Madeleine Albright became his 
choice for the next Secretary of State. 
Did Madeleine Albright become Secretary of State because 
she was a woman? Clearly, gender alone does not explain her 
nomination and confirmation; equally clear is the fact that it 
played a role. Albright was in the first instance qualified for the 
job; about that, there is no doubt. And while her relationship with 
Hillary Clinton, the mobilization of the "old girl's network," the 
Democratic Party's reliance on women voters and women's 
groups, and President Clinton's desire to break with tradition all 
combined to propel her toward the nomination, so did her per-
formance as U.N. ambassador, and her loyalty to Clinton and 
reputation as a "team player." Her communication skills and 
knowledge of foreign policy were also important factors that 
contrib uted to her selection. 
POLITICAL STYLE 
In her memoirs, Albright (2003 , 341) refers to Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson's axiom that "the first requirement of a 
statesman is that he be dull," and then quips that "Acheson said 
nothing about stateswomen, however , so I didn't feel bound by 
his prescription." And, in fact, the nation 's new top diplomat was 
anything but dull. Says Albright (2003 , 341): " I could have cho-
sen to submerge the differences as much as possible and done 
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my best to 1m1tate the men who preceded me. I could have 
shunned informal settings, dressed conservatively, and reined in 
my penchant for blunt speaking. But the job would not have been 
as enjoyable, and I would not have been able to accomplish as 
much as I did." 
Albright emerged after her nomination and confirmation as a 
kind of media superstar, in part because of the novelty of her be-
ing the first female secretary of state.8 On the day her nomination 
was announced, she was greeted as a celebrity by passengers on 
a commuter train bound to New York. As she moved from car to 
car, Albright signed autographs and received congratulations 
from the commuters. In the early months of her tenure, Albright 
received extremely favorable press coverage, including flattering 
profiles in Newsweek and Vogue. She was even featured in the 
Mini-Page, a Sunday supplement distributed to hundreds of 
newspapers, with a headline that read "First Woman Secretary of 
State Talks to Kids." Inside there was a message from Albright, a 
word jumble featuring such terms as "trea ties," "visas," and 
"cabinet," and a connect-the-dots puzzle that challenged children 
to draw her hair (Albright 2003, 342). 
Albright decided to use her celebrity to spark greater public 
interest in international affairs. She used her popularity and 
speaking skills to take the administration's foreign policy mes-
sage to the "average American," and sought to redefine the job of 
America's top diplomat in a way not attempted since the days of 
Henry Kissinger. Thomas Lippman (2004, 2) explains that "Al-
bright loves being a celebrity," and she grasped that "personal 
fame and popularity could be effective levers in negotiations 
with Congress and with foreign leaders." In the post-Cold War 
world, a secretary of state had to look for new ways to win sup-
8 She was confirmed by the U.S. Senate with a 99-0 vote. 
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port for the president's foreign policy positions. The president 
she served could no longer argue that lack of support for his for-
eign policy agenda was necessarily jeopardizing the national se-
curity of the United States. Bill Clinton had to sell his foreign 
policy to the Congress and to the American people, and Made-
leine Albright became his chief sales representative. Margaret 
Tutwiler, senior adviser to Secretary of State James Baker, ex-
plained that Albright understood "that a foreign policy initiative 
can only be successful with an American public that supports it 
and a Congress that understands it."9 
Secretary Albright emphasized that "people are finding it 
harder and harder to relate to foreign policy," and that "one of 
my prime jobs here is to reconnect the American people to for-
eign policy and make it understandable." 10 This is why Albright 
made nineteen domestic trips during her first year in office-
more than any other secretary of state-trying to convince citi-
zens that foreign policy was important in their lives. She told 
high school students that learning about foreign policy was 
"cool" and "awesome." Two months into her term, she imple-
mented the practice of floating all of her speeches on the State 
Department home page on the Internet, under the menu heading 
"Reaching Out to Americans" (Blood 1999). 
She was highly visible in the mass media. In addition to ap-
pearing on the various Sunday talk shows, Albright made ap-
pearances on CNN's "Larry King Live" and NPR's "The Diane 
Rehm Show." Early in 1997, she launched a full-court press to 
win support for the Chemical Weapons Treaty. She appeared on 
numerous local television programs in such places as Cincinnati, 
Birmingham, Memphis, San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, and 
9 Dobbs. Michael. 1997. "Albright Reshapes Role of Nation 's Top Diplomat ," Washing-
ion Post, 15 June, p. A-I . 
10 Ibid . 
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Denver. Thomas Lippman provided this account of these activ i-
ties: 
In just over an hour, Albright reached untold thou-
sands of ordinary Americans with the clear-cut, sim-
ply worded message that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is good for them and that the Senate 
should approve it when it votes Thursday. . .. The 
event was more political campaign than diplomacy, 
and in many ways it was typical of how Albright has 
operated during her first three months in office. She 
has said repeatedly that one of her highest priorities is 
to convince Americans that foreign policy matters, 
and she is using techniques never before seen in 
Foggy Bottom to accomplish that. 11 
According to at least one biographer, Albright's profile was 
so high that she proved successful in reaching not only American 
citizens, but publics throughout the world. Albright, said Thomas 
Blood (1999, 264), "has somehow managed to put US foreign 
policy on a first-name basis with the rest of the world. To thou-
sands, perhaps millions, of people whom she will never meet, 
whose vision of this country is based only on what they read in 
papers or see on television, she symbohzes what we stand for . 
. . . For the first time, instead of seeing a middle-aged white man 
in a dull suit, they see a grandmother in a flak jacket, someone 
whom peop le flock to see like a rock star." 
Public outreach was not always successful. An infamous town 
hall meeting, held in Columbus, Ohio in early 1998, proved a 
minor public relations disaster. The meeting was organized for 
administration officials to explain U.S. policy towards Iraq, and 
to help build public support for a military campaign designe d to 
11 Lippman, Thomas. 1997 ... Plain-Talking Albright Campaigns for Foreign Policy,'· 
Washington Post, 21 April, p. A-1. 
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ing crisis in Kosovo. As the policies of the second-tern, Clinton 
administration produced ambiguous and contested results, the 
Secretary of State received more critical coverage in the media, 
although it should be noted that Albright remained quite popular 
with the American people. According to the Gallup poll, public 
approval of the secretary hovered between 61 % and 69% from 
late 1998 to just before the election of 2000 (Gallup Poll 2000). 
In pursuing her goal of reconnecting the American people to 
foreign policy, Albright did not hesitate to utilize the novelty of 
her position as America's first female secretary of state. Accord-
ing to Albright, being a woman "makes me more accessib le" and 
helps overcome the common view of foreign policy as an "ar-
cane science ... carried on by stuffy diplomats." 13 On her first full 
day as secretary of state, she did a little pirouette in front of hun-
dreds of American diplomats. "You may have noticed that I do 
not look like Warren Christopher," she cracked, drawing laughter 
from her mostly male audience. 14 Her approach to diplomacy 
was very personal. A small illustration of this technique came in 
early 1997, when she told U.S. troops in South Korea how, as a 
child growing up in London during World War 11, she had first 
heard the phrase "the Yanks are coming." "That was the first 
time that I fell in love with American men in uniform," she 
joked. 15 
According to her aides, Albright consciously played on her 
femininity to win over her male colleagues. She was seen hold-
ing hands with Senator Jesse Helms, the notoriously difficu lt 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. In France, 
the foreign minister greeted her with roses and a kiss on the 
13 Dobbs , Michael. 1997. "Albright Reshapes Role of Nation 's Top Diplomat ," Washing-
ton Post, 15 June, p. A-1 . 
14 Dobbs. Michael. 1997. "Albright Approach : Upfront . Personal ," Washington Post, 24 
February, p . A-13 . 
15 Ibid . 
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diminish Iraq's capability to produce weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Albright , Defense Secretary William Cohen , and national 
security adviser Sandy Berger, all struggled to fend off a series 
of hostile questions about the administration 's policy, and suf-
fered heckling by the audience. The meeting exposed deep 
doubts about the policy among some in the audience and kept 
Albright , Cohen and Berger on the defensive much of the time. 
One White House official said that the event was "like watching 
a car crash take place before your eyes." 12 Albright (2003, 283) 
admits that following the Columbus event , "Ohio State" became 
the codeword within the administration for any hare-brained 
scheme of communicating their message. 
By 1998, the same press that had been fawning all over Al-
bright had turned much more negative . A number of stories were 
published detailing how she had failed to live up to the expecta-
tions of her first year. Albright understood that this was to be 
expected . Reflecting on the change, she (2003 , 352) recognized 
that "conventional wisdom about prominent officials often had a 
short shelf life," and that "I knew r would get nowhere if I took 
the attacks personally ." Thomas Lippman (2004 , 6) explained 
that Albright found that "the currency of her word devalued by 
overuse and the novelty of her style diminished to some extent 
by its irrelevance ." Her efforts to connect with the American 
people sometimes led to overexposure and the perception that 
the real foreign policy director in the Clinton administration was 
the national security advisor, Sandy Berger. In addition , there 
was less time for television interviews and visits with school-
children, as Albright spent more and more time dealing with a 
host of international problems- including the India-Pakistan 
nuclear standoff , the Middle East peace process, and a develop-
12 Baiz, Dan and John Haris . 1998. "A Favored Clinton Format is turned Against His 
Team: · Wnshing ton Post, 19 February, p. A-22 . 
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hand. In Africa, she was photographed cradling a starving child, 
a scene almost unimaginable with any of her male predecessors. 
The press paid a great deal of attention to Albright's appear-
ance, including her striking pins or brooches. 16 Soon Albright 
was choosing pins based on the message of the day. There were 
patriotic pins, military pins, and even a missile pin. Albright 
(2004, 343) explains that "l used a spider on those (rare) occa-
sions when I was feeling devious, a balloon when I was up at the 
Capitol building to show bipartisanship, and a bee when I was 
looking for someone to sting." 
Eventually, Albright developed her comments on the gender 
issue into a comfortable routine. At a luncheon for the Women's 
Legal Defense Fund in 1997, she told the following story: 
I have decided that being a woman has several impor-
tant advantages. One is makeup. If a sixty-year-old 
male secretary of state has had a bad day, he has two 
choices-to look like a tired old man, or to look like 
a tired old man with makeup. But with a little help, I 
can at least convince myself that I look as fresh as I 
feel right now (Lippman 2004, 31 ). 
Despite the fears of her opponents within the Clinton admini-
stration, Secretary Albright persuasively argued that her gender 
was not a liability when dealing with foreign leaders. Believing 
otherwise reflected sexist assumptions that were not unlike the 
distorted way in which the U.S. media treated the novelty of a 
female secretary of state. After all, numerous countries had been 
led by female prime ministers or presidents, and there were also 
many instances of female foreign ministers from all over the 
1
• Her pins became so important that they inspired a well-known art gallery owner to 
invite jewelers from all over the world to create Albright-inspired pins . The result was a 
traveling art exhibit and book entitled Broochi11g It Diplom(l(ical/y: A Tribute to Made-
line K. Albright . 
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world. In this connection , one of the biggest tests for Albright 
was her first visit to Saudi Arabia in September 1997. By all ac-
counts , the visit went off without incident. Thomas Lippman 
(2004 , 35) argued that Albright 's arrival in Saudi Arabia "was 
not much different from an arrival in any other country, thus 
demonstrating again that the fact of Albright 's femaleness was 
not an obstacle to job performance. " 
Albright also managed to balance her femininity with a "ma-
cho" side. She learned a valuable lesson from her time with the 
Michael Dukakis presidential campaign when the candidate 
ended up looking ridiculous while riding in a military tank with a 
strange grin. Albright told an interviewer in 1989 that "Dukakis 
did not have the national security credibility to deliver his mes-
sage, because people did not see him as having originally 
crossed the threshold of machoism. " 17 She would not make that 
same mistake. So she threw out the first ball at a Baltimore Ori-
oles game clad in an Orioles cap and jacket. She showed up on 
aircraft carriers surrounded by soldiers while wearing a military 
flak jacket. She courted the military establishment in a variety of 
ways , including visits to various military installations (Lippman 
2004) . She was frequently photographed wearing a Stetson, like 
a sheriff riding into town . In her tenure as U.N . Ambassador and 
Secretary of State, Albright was known to use stern language 
with both opponents and friends of the United States. 
Yet, this was a "toughness " that did not spill over into harsh-
ness or exaggeration. In the view of Democratic consultant 
Mandy Greenwald , Albright was one of the few top female poli-
ticians who succeeded in projecting "an image of strength with-
out being called a bitch. Think about other prominent female 
politicians, women like Dianne Feinstein, Christie Whitman, 
17 Dobbs, Michael. 1997. "Albright Reshapes Role of Nation's Top Diplomat," Washing-
ton Post , 15 June, p. A-1 . 
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Geraldine Ferraro. Sooner or later that word tends to follow them 
around.' 18 Albright's toughness was combined with deeply felt 
patriotism. While she was not the first to describe the United 
States as "the indispensable nation," the phrase became closely 
associated with her. Her affection for her adopted country was 
real, and her views on American leadership were rooted in her 
experience as a refugee from Nazism and communism. As we 
will see, she often took the most hawkish positions on certain 
foreign policy issues, especially those dealing with the crises in 
former Yugoslavia. 
Thomas Lippman (2004, 35) draws this conclusion about Al-
bright's position as the first female secretary of state: 
Albright chose to emphasize her gender in her public 
conduct-j oking about makeup, holding babies, 
flashing her trademark jewelry-and in some of the 
policy issues she elected to stress, such as the plight 
of women refugees. This approach stems from the 
fact that she has never regarded her gender as a liabil-
ity; on the contrary, it proved to be quite useful as she 
took on with zest the first major task she set for her-
self as secretary of state, which was to maximize her 
personal popularity so she could use it as a tool to 
forge support for the administration's foreign policy. 
Hence Albright unquestionably capitalized on aspects of her 
gender. Part of her popularity was based on the novelty of her 
being the first female secretary of state, though she also had a 
compelling life story and media-friendly personality. Certain 
media doors were open to her because of her notoriety. She was 
willing to use her gender to promote dialogue with the American 
people as well as to charm or even disarm her "opponents." On 
the other hand , she balanced her feminine charm with a "macho" 
18 Ibid . 
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image, using tough talk and appeals to patriotism . An interesting 
combination of masculine and feminine qualities and symbol s 
came together in the person of Madeleine Albright. 
POLIT ICAL ID EOLOGY 
There were two powerful and related influence s on Albright' s 
view of foreign policy- her childhood experience s of fleeing 
Nazism and communism and the views of her father, Joseph 
Korbel. One leading diplomat argued that "more than anyone 
else in the administration , Madeleine is driven by her own biog-
raphy. Time and time again she raises the sights to the moral and 
historic issues" (Lippman 2004 , 97) . She has used her life story 
in the service both of her public image and of the policie s she 
advocates. 
Albright 's family, as noted above , fled the Nazi takeover of 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the family left that nation again 
with the communist take-over in 1948. The experience of twice 
fleeing her native land has helped to mold Albright's foreign pol-
icy philosophy, and made her more disposed to an activist for-
eign policy than were some of her colleagues . Her main 
historical reference point is Munich in 1938, when the Western 
allies abandoned Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler . At her swear-
ing in ceremony , President Clinton remarked that "she watched 
her world fall apart , and ever since, she has dedicated her life to 
spreading to the rest of the world the freedom and tolerance her 
family found here in America. " 19 It is this basic experience and 
understanding of modem Europ ean history that distinguishes 
Albright from many American leaders. The former President of 
Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel , a close friend for more than a 
•• Dobbs, Michael and John Goshko. 1996 "Albright 's Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign 
Policy Beliefs," Washing ton Post, 6 December, p. A-25. 
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decade, said that "she is aware of the meaning of symbols like 
Munich, symbols of division that never lead to peace and stabil-
ity. She knows all about appeasement, about democracy making 
concessions to a dictator" (Blackman 1998, 13). 
Albright's father, Josef Korbel, had been a high-level official 
in the Czech foreign ministry in the years after World War II, and 
he had great influence on her thinking. The events informing his 
postwar worldview were the crude domination of once sovereign 
Eastern European states first by Nazi Germany and then by the 
Soviet Union. David Halberstam (2002, 379) states that Al-
bright's father was "moderately liberal on domestic issues, 
[while] on foreign policy he remained unbendingly anticommun-
ist, a hawk during the Vietnam War, deeply offended by the stu-
dent protests of that period." He had high moral principles, but 
believed that states needed to act with a dose of hard-headed re-
alism. Despite his experience in diplomacy, he stressed that the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
·'no longer an argument among gentlemen" (Dobbs 2000, 261 ). 
The United States and other democracies needed to protect them-
selves by all available means. 
Understanding Josef is the key to understanding Madeleine. 
Michael Dobbs (2000, 259) believes that "it is difficult to over-
state the impact that he had on her, both consciously and uncon-
sciously, or the extent to which she modeled herself after him. 
Pleasing her father was one of the great motivating forces of her 
life" Albright (2003, 80). describes her father as "my greatest 
friend and advisor." She was the dutiful daughter, following in 
her father's footsteps. Even after his death in 1977, Albright 
(2003, 80) remarked that, "as I sought to emulate him, I felt that 
he never left my side because I never completely stopped think-
ing about him." 
In the internal debates within the first-term Clinton admini-
stration, U.N. Ambassador Albright was usually on the side of 
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those who favored a more assertive role for the United States in 
such trouble spots as Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. A famous story 
about Albright involves a confrontation with Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs Colin Powell. In a meeting about the costs and dis-
advantages of an intervention in Bosnia, Albright turned to Pow-
ell and declared, "What is the use of having this wonderfu l 
military if we never use it?" In his memoirs , Powell (1996 576) 
recalls that he almost had "an aneurysm" following this ex-
change. Albright was an early opponent of the Powell doctrine 
that the United States should restrict its military interventions to 
situations in which its vital interests are threatened, and should 
always insist on using overwhelming force. After numerous 
clashes with Albright over U.S. policy towards interventio n, 
Powell summarized her view as "you dropped off a soldier or 
two here to keep the peace, and a soldier or two there to make 
the world better, and sooner or later you had a policy. But you 
would also have American soldiers strung out vulnerably all over 
the world with little domestic political support" (Halbersta m 
2002, 378). 
Of all her colleagues, Albright was the person least affected 
by Vietnam, and this may have influenced her willingness to use 
force. With respect to foreign policy attitudes, she had basically 
skipped a generation. David Halberstam (2002, 378) explains 
She was literally and figuratively a child of Munich, 
the Holocaust, and the post-World War II descent of 
the lron Curtain, not of the Vietnam experience, and 
of the American military being impaled in an un-
popular, unwinnable war twelve thousand miles 
away, and the doubts it had created among many of 
her contemporaries about America ' s use of its power. 
The passions of the Vietnam era, though she was just 
corning of age at that time, graduating from college 
in 1959, just a few years before Vietnam began to 
emerge as the dominant concern for the most politi-
cally involved people of her generation, always re-
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mained distant. Instead, she was very much a product 
of her personal history. 
In the late sixties, Albright was busy being a housewife, 
working on her doctorate, and remaining aloof from the turmoil 
of the 1960s. Her father was a hard-liner; her mentor at Colum-
bia , Zbigniew Brzezinksi, was as well; and her doctoral thesis 
about contemporary Soviet repression in central Europe fit easily 
into the anti-communist camp. Her family was intensely anti-
communist and quite grateful for their place in America. As a 
young woman, records Halberstam (2002, 378), Albright was not 
"eager to criticize America or its foreign policy even during one 
of its most tormented periods; she was not about to disparage the 
strong, generous hand that had welcomed her and her family. To 
her, this country even in its darkest moment had been America 
the hospitable and the just." 
In March 1998, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosovic began a 
bloody crackdown in the largely Albanian-inhabited province of 
Kosovo. As with Bosnia, Albright took a hard-line approach to-
ward Serbia and Milosovic. Along with General Wesley Clark 
and special envoy Robert Gelbhard, Albright argued for the use 
of air strikes against the Serbs as early as spring 1998, but Presi-
dent Clinton resisted. For eight months, the United States did 
almost nothing, except watch from the sidelines as Serbian 
troops shelled and torched Albanian villages, killing hundreds of 
people and driving more than a quarter of a million ethnic Alba-
nians from their homes. 
Albright's interest in the Balkans was personal, even visceral. 
She reacted to events in Bosnia and Kosovo in an entirely differ-
ent way from her administration colleagues, for they seemed to 
her a repetition of the events of her childhood. For Albright, ne-
gotiations with Milosovic were useless because he only under-
stood force. The symbol of Munich was part of Albright's 
consciousness, and appeasement of Milosovic was not an option. 
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Secretary Albright understood that Kosovo was a repeat of Bos-
nia, and that the United States would sooner or later have to take 
military action. Halberstam (2002, 376) states that "she was ab-
solutely certain of her beliefs about what needed to be done in 
Kosovo. She was convinced the villain was Slobodan Milosevic, 
and until he was dealt with, nothing good was going to happen." 
In January 1999, Serbian troops massacred approximately 45 
Kosovar civilians, and this brutal action forced the Clinton ad-
ministration to take action. A new peace initiative was launched 
in February, and Secretary Albright tried to negotiate an end to 
the conflict between the Serbs and Kosovars. When the peace 
conference failed, it was a huge setback for Albright. Later, she 
told friends that it was "one of the worst experiences of her life" 
(Dobbs 2000, 416). As peace seemed impossible , Albright 
pushed hard for military action against Milosovic. 
The Kosovo conflict became known as "Madeleine 's War." 
Because Albright had for so long favored adoption of a harsh 
stance against Milosovic, it was clear that she was the leading 
force behind convincing President Clinton to take this action. 
The United States and NATO began an air campaign against the 
Serbs in an effort to convince Milosovic to pull his troops out of 
Kosovo , and Albright was confident of an early success. "l don't 
see this as a long-term operation ," she told a television inter-
viewer on the opening night of air war. "l think that this is some-
thing ... that is achievable within a relatively short period of time" 
(Dobbs 2000, 417). 
As it turned out, Albright and her team had seriously mis-
judged Milosovic's intentions and determination on Kosovo. The 
Secretary of State believed that the mere threat of bombing, or at 
most a few days of bombing, would probably be sufficient to 
force Milosevic to back down. Albright and the President came 
under tough criticism when the air campaign initially failed to 
force Milosevic to reverse course. The bombing campaign was 
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extended from days to weeks as the Americans and NATO relied 
on airpower alone to move the Serbs out of Kosovo. There was 
an obvious gap between Albright's harsh words and the cautious 
half-war that NATO was actually waging. For political reasons, 
such as minimalizing casualties and keeping the Europeans on 
board, NATO was obliged to wage war in a way that ran counter 
to all the military textbooks. 
Although the military fight was restrained, the policy eventu-
ally prevailed. Milosevic ultimately recognized that he could not 
prevail, and Clinton and Albright emerged victorious. In political 
terms, America's victory in Kosovo was an ambivalent one be-
cause the costs of victory were huge-including the deaths of 
thousands of innocent people, Albanians and Serbs alike, billions 
of dollars in economic damage, and strained relations with Rus-
sia and China. Indeed , Michael Hirsch (1999, 45) suggests that 
Albright's tough position on the Balkans led her in exactly the 
wrong direction: 
Given the limits of U.S. interests in the Balkans, it is 
tempting to conclude that something very like a Mu-
nich-style partition was needed here. Let's face it: 
Milosevic didn't have the intention or capacity to 
rampage, Hitler-like, through Europe. All he ever 
wanted was his rump Yugoslavia, where he em-
ployed Hitler-like tactics, but a negotiated settlement 
might have kept the lid on his ethnic cleansing cam-
paigns. And Albright, because of her personal his-
tory, was probably the least likely person to employ 
such a negotiating trick . 
Nevertheless, the defeat of the ethnic cleansers in Kosovo 
was a personal vindication for the Secretary of State. "They 
called this Madeleine's war," German foreig n minister Joschka 
Fischer told Albright on the day that Serbian forces began their 
retreat from Ko::,ovo, "and you won it" (Dobbs 2000, 424). Al-
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bright (2003, 421) herself concluded that, despite "al I the doubt-
ers, the alliance had held together, and through the creative mix-
ing of diplomacy and force, we had won. It was a heady 
moment. .. .I replied that it was NATO's victory, but I did wonder 
how those who had named it my war as a pejorative felt now. At 
[a] G-8 dinner .. .! was the subject of chivalrous and wonderfully 
exaggerated toasts." 
An important policy area in which gender appears to have 
been relevant was international women's issues. Secretary Al-
bright frequently voiced the opinion that improving women's 
lives in other countries should become an integral part of U.S . 
foreign policy. At an International Woman's Day ceremony, Al-
bright stressed that, "advancing the status of women is not only a 
moral imperative, it is being actively integrated into the foreign 
policy of the United States. It is our mission. It is the right thing 
to do, and frankly it is the smart thing to do" (Lipmann 2004, 
302). In her memoirs, Albright (2003, 340-1) states that she 
wanted to send the message: 
To each State Department bureau and embassy that I 
cared about whether women were included in democ-
racy-building projects , whether programs were un-
derway to combat violence against women, whether 
microenterprise was being encouraged to give 
women access to credit, whether the special needs of 
women refugees were being met, and whether family 
planning programs were being given the priority they 
deserved . 
Secretary Albright chaired the President 's Interagency Coun-
cil on Women which was responsible for coordinating the activi-
ties of various agencies such as USAID, the Justice Department, 
the Labor Department and others in addressing international 
women 's issues . Albright steered modest amounts of additional 
monies to aid refugee women , to promote the education of girls 
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in developing nations, and to enable women in the poorest coun-
tries to start small businesses. A minor but perhaps telling exam-
ple of this new approach is how Albright and the State 
Department helped to set standards for refugee camps on how far 
women's toilets should be located from their sleeping quarters. 
This policy detail was part of an effort to reduce the serious 
problem of violence against women at refugee sites. Similarly, 
Albright emphasized dealing with the growing problem of the 
international trafficking in women and girls. She encouraged 
President Clinton to issue an executive order to combat such traf-
ficking (Lippman 2004). Regarding the importance of these ef-
forts, Thomas Lippman (2004, 306) concludes 
These are modest programs; no direct U.S. economic 
assistance or advice from Washington on moderniz-
ing legal codes is intended by itself to rectify inequal-
ity or end violence over a broad horizon. Much of the 
work that has been done has been attitudinal rather 
than material, such as the administration's sponsor-
ship of activism against sex-based violence in Kenya. 
And some of Albright's efforts have amounted to 
nothing more than old-fashioned jawboning, trying to 
persuade people in other societies that they would be 
better off if women there had full social, economic, 
and political parity. 
Since President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton were 
also enthusiastic proponents of bringing women's issues to the 
center of U.S. foreign policy, it is difficult to untangle the inter-
action between an administration committed to promoting 
women's rights at home and abroad and the individual initiatives 
of Secretary Albright. But her concern for the welfare of women 
is clear. There is no doubt that she drew much more attention to 
international women's issues than her predecessors had. Sym-
VOL. 33 2005 
74 LASHER 
bolically and rhetorically, the change was actually profound ; 
substantively , the changes were more modest. 
Despite her efforts, Secretary Albright was not able to win 
Senate approval of the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, an international treaty signed by 
President Carter in 1979 which had not been ratified for almost 
twenty years because it was viewed as unenforceable. In her last 
months in office, Albright made the rounds of television news 
programs to conduct farewell interviews. In these appearances , 
she rarely referred to her achievements in the arena of interna-
tional women 's rights . It is also quite interesting that in her 
memoirs of over 500 pages , only a handful of pages even addre ss 
the importance of women 's issue s. Former Ambassador Julie 
Chang Bloch (2004) concluded that Albright was not able to 
" make women 's needs and rights central to U.S . diplomacy or 
carry out a feminist international relations agenda. " 
If in fact women in general are more pacifistic than men , it is 
obvious that Secretary Albright was an exception . She was the 
early hawk , pushing for strong action against Slobodon Milo so-
vic much sooner than any of her colleagues in the Clinton ad-
ministration. The delays and modest respon se of the Clinton 
administration were not her preferred option s. On the other hand , 
the power of the Munich analogy and her deep-rooted anticom-
munism were not particularly relevant outside of issues like the 
Balkans and NATO expansion . She favored the ambivalent and 
moderate Clinton policies on relations with China , on dealin g 
with the continuing threat of Saddam Hussein 's Iraq , and the par-
tial nonproliferation agreement with North Korea. With respect 
to these non-European issues, Madeleine Albright , the super-
hawk , fit in with the other pragmatists of the Clinton team. How-
ever, she did try to make women's issues a major part of U .S. 
foreign policy concerns , and she achieved some modest succes s 
with this effort. 
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COOPERATION: BIPARTISANSHIP 
Given her background as a congressional aide and congres-
sional liaison officer for the National Security Council , Albright 
was well aware of the need to cultivate good relations with 
members of Congress. Noting that the chairmen of the congres-
sional foreign policy committees were all Republicans, Albright 
explained that reaching out to Congress was not only "the right 
thing to do, but it's also the smart thing to do."20 Her efforts at 
bipartisanship actually extended beyond Congress. Her first trip 
as Secretary was to Texas, to visit former President Bush and 
former Secretary of State James Baker, whom she praised for 
having made progress in the Middle East peace process. In April 
1997, she flew to Michigan to honor former President Gerald 
Ford at the rededication of his presidential museum, and Presi-
dent Ford rewarded Albright by calling her "the Tiger Woods of 
foreign policy" (Lippman 2004, 39). 
Many times, Albright claimed that once she became involved 
in official U.S. diplomacy, she had all her partisan instincts "sur-
gically removed." Political consultant Dick Morris explained that 
Albright established a trust level with conservatives enjoyed by 
no secretary of state since John Foster Dulles. "They see her as 
one of them, even though she is a Democrat," argued Morris.21 
One of the smartest moves Albright made was to court Republi-
can Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and a frequent critic of President Clinton's 
foreign policy. Senator Helms was a fan of Albright from her 
days as U.N. Ambassador. At her confirmation hearing in 1993, 
Albright caught the attention of Senator Helms with her life story 
and her pledge that she would "never advocate giving up sover-
20 Dobbs , Michael. 1997. "Albright Reshapes Role of Nation 's Top Diplomat ," Washing-
ton Post, 15 June , p. A-1. 
21 Ibid . 
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eignty of the American people in an area where it is in our na-
tional interest" (Blood 1999, 86.) After the first day of hearings , 
Helms confided to a friend that, "Albright understands the world 
like a refugee, a multilingual , multicultural warrior for human 
rights and democratic principles" (Blood 1999, 87). 
Albright won even more points with Helms and other Repub-
licans when she maneuvered to oust U.N. Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali as her term at the U.N. was winding 
down. Boutros-Ghali was extremely unpopular with congres-
sional Republicans . In fact, Albright later admitted that Boutros 
Ghali 's "head" was worth about the $1 billion in U.N. arrears 
owed by the United States. 
In March 1997, Albright spoke at Wingate University, a 
small, private college that was the alma mater of Senator Helms. 
Albright and Helms arrived at the school smiling and holding 
hands , a flirtatious gesture that only a female secretary of state 
could pull off Finding common ground with Senator Helms, Al-
bright told the students at Wingate that she and Helms "both be-
lieve that the concept of individual liberty set out in the 
American Constitution remains , after more than 200 years, the 
world 's most powerful and positive force for change." Then she 
added that , "we both agree that if our freedoms are to survive 
through the next American century, we cannot turn our backs on 
the world" (Blackman l 998, 298). Later that year, Albright at-
tended a private birthday party for Helms ' wife and presented the 
Senator with a blue T-shirt that read: "Somebody at the State De-
partment Loves Me." Helms and Albright were also spotted 
dancing together at the latter 's sixtieth birthday party. Albright 's 
authentic American patriotism appealed to Helms, and they de-
veloped an understanding that their mutual respect for the under-
lying values of democracy allowed them to debate and disagree 
on particular issues . 
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Another reason for the unusual relationship between the two 
is that, unlike previous Clinton administration officials, Albright 
took Helms seriously. She sought compromise not confrontation. 
Helms' aides praised Albright for working with their boss on im-
portant issues such as the merging of foreign policy agencies into 
the State Department, a step opposed by Christopher. "There has 
been a strategic shift in thinking toward the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee," said a GOP staffer. "During the first two years 
of the first term, they fought us on every issue, and the result was 
a train wreck. Albright has taken a completely different tack. "22 
When Albright was experiencing serious criticism throughout 
1998, her new friend Jesse Helms came to her defense. In her 
memoirs, Albright (2003, 353) reports on a phone call from 
Helms in which he defended her actions. Telling her to brush 
aside the tough media criticism, Helms added "I may not always 
agree with you, but you always tell me the truth. You give it to 
me straight. I can't ask for better than that." Senator Helms con-
cluded that Albright's job was secure because any attempt to oust 
her would have to go through his committee. Albright (2003, 
353) admitted that Helms sometimes infuriated her, but at that 
moment "I was very glad that we were friends." 
The attention Albright gave to Congress paid political divi-
dends in April 1997, when the Senate voted 74 to 26 to ratify the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. The International Chemical 
Weapons Treaty was conceived during the Reagan administra-
tion, and was designed to call on states to cease the production 
and use of chemical weapons. Although the treaty had been ne-
gotiated and signed by President Bush, it had been bogged down 
in the Senate, largely due to opposition by key Republicans in-
cluding Helms. Albright's courting of the Senator, together with 
22 Dobbs, Michael. 1997. "Albright Reshapes Role ofNation 's Top Diplomat ," Washing-
ton Post, 15 June, p . A- I. 
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a vigilant public relations effort to win support for the treaty, fi-
nally did the trick. While Helms ultimately voted against the 
treaty, he aided Albright by doing nothing to block its passage. 
Other successes included congressional approval of NATO 
expansion, a policy strongly supported by Congressional Repub-
licans. Albright stymied congressional efforts to pull American 
troops out of Bosnia in the late 1990s. A major reorganization of 
the State Department , including the abolishment of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Infor-
mation Agency, was accomplished with the assistance of Senator 
Helms. 23 Another victory was legislation that authorized the pay-
ment of America 's debt to the United Nations. While the final 
legislation was not signed until 1999, Albright had achieved one 
of the main foreign policy goals of the Clinton administration . 
Of note was the fact that it was Representative Chris Shays , a 
Republican from New Jersey, who was mostly responsible for 
the long delay in passing the U.N . debt bill; Senator Helms had 
already been on board for months (Lippman 2004, 80). 
It would be misleading , of course, to suggest that Secretary 
Albright 's relations with other senators or the entire Congress 
followed the Jesse Helms model. Even the mutually beneficial 
relationship with Helms diminished somewhat over the final two 
years of the Clinton administration. Albright suffered consider-
able defeats, such as the failure to win approval for "fast-track " 
trade negotiating authority , and the rejection of the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty . Albright had to fight hard for small 
increases in the foreign affairs budget , and she left office with 
international programs still underfunded. Thomas Lippman 
(2004, 86) concludes that "Albright achieved mixed results in 
Congress. She probably did as well as anyone could have , given 
23 The responsibil ities and resources for these two independent agencies were folded into 
the State Department. 
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that Congress was controlled by the opposition party and gripped 
by the White House sex scandal." It is fair to say that Madeleine 
Albright was much more successful in working with a Republi-
can congress than was her predecessor Warren Christopher. 
Did Madeleine Albright's gender affect her ability to craft a 
generally workable relationship with a Republican congress? Her 
previous legislative experience undoubtedly helped her find 
ways to cooperate with members on Capitol Hill, while her un-
abashed patriotism and reputation as a foreign policy hawk cer-
tainly did not harm her standing with Senate Republicans like 
Jesse Helms and John Warner. It is tempting to dismiss her 
cozying up to Helms and others as superficial and somewhat 
silly. Yet it seems clear that Madeleine Albright's gender had at 
least some impact on her relative successes working with the 
Congress on a number of important issues. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the activities of one of the two 
highest ranking female foreign policy-makers in U.S. history , 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In a number of respects , 
gender played a role in her conduct and accomplishments, and in 
her perception and treatment by others . Despite her qualifica-
tions , Albright won her lofty position at least partially because of 
her gender . Also, there was considerable concern whether her 
gender somehow disqualified her from service as the nation 's 
chief diplomat. Albright used the notoriety of her role as the first 
female secretary of state to considerable advantage. She utilized 
this notoriety to build a kind of "celebrity status," which she then 
used to facilitate her efforts to speak to the citizenry about the 
importance of foreign policy issues. Her gender helped her carry 
out her duties as secretary of state. Quite consciously, she often 
employed her gender as a "tool" to further particular policies . 
Finally, Albright was fairly successful in forging a cooperative 
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relationship with Republicans in Congress, and she was quite 
willing to use her gender to mollify and charm Republicans who 
were not disposed to support the Clinton foreign policy agenda. 
Ideology is the one area where gender seems not to have 
played much of a role. While the evidence is ambiguous, there 
has certainly been much speculation that women might bring a 
less aggressive approach to the foreign policy process. That does 
not seem to be the case for Madeleine Albright. Albright often 
took a hard-line approach, especially on the issues of Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Outside of Europe, she seemed comfortable with the 
multilateral and ambiguous approach of the rest of the Clinton 
administration. On the other hand, Albright made incorporating 
concern for women's issues into the goals of U.S. foreign policy 
a priority, and she had some modest success in this regard. 
The conclusion drawn here about the relevance of Albright's 
gender must be leavened by the understanding that it is difficult 
to untangle the overlapping influences and interactive effects of 
gender, party membership, personal temperament, and the dy-
namics of a particular administration. In addition, broad gener-
alizations concerning women foreign policy-makers can hardly 
be drawn on the basis of a single case, and this is perhaps espe-
cially so in this instance, since many of Madeleine Albright's 
actions were shaped by the uniqueness of her position as the 
"first woman secretary of state." The beliefs and conduct, influ-
ence and styles, of top women foreign policy-makers is a topic 
which will require much more study, as more women come to 
occupy those positions. In the case of the United States, we will 
want to compare to Madeleine Albright those who follow in her 
pioneering path. 
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